Introduction
As in many other (European) languages, the second person personal pronoun du ('thou') in German is not exclusively used to refer deictically to the addressee of the utterance. In addition to this canonical use we increasingly find uses in which the referent of du cannot be the addressee (alone); this is what Grimm (1852) calls a "shifted use" of the pronoun. For instance1, a speaker might say was meinst_e wie schnell de [= clitic form of du] was ANgedreht krichst ('you don't know how quickly you get knocked up'), referring not specifically to the recipient, but to all unmarried men who have sex with a woman.
The spread of du as a non-addressee deictic pronoun in German seems to proceed at the expense of the generic usage of the so-called generic (or impersonal) pronoun man ('one'), a process that might show parallels with the loss of OE man and the (much more recent) establishment of you as a generic pronoun in English.2 In comparison with the traditional generic pronoun man ('one'), the 'new generic' du ('thou') is often considered to achieve a more personal meaning, as it still carries some flavour of the homophonous addressee-deictic pronoun (cf. Kluge 2011; Stukenbrock & Bahr 2017) .
In this paper, we will present a slightly different picture and argue that non-addressee deictic du as found in present-day German is neither new nor (always) generic. It rather goes back at least to the 18 th century, although there is some evidence that it has been spreading over the last 50 years or so. In addition, we claim that from the very beginnings of this usage, it has been possible to use du ('thou') not only for generic statements, but also for subjective utterances by a speaker who mainly talks about his or her own experiences. The subjective use therefore cannot be considered a secondary development, based on the generic use. In these cases, the relevant question is not primarily why the speaker uses du instead of man ('one'), rather we have to ask why he or she does not say ich ('I') and instead choses to use du. We will present some thoughts on the specific inferences triggered by this deictic shift, making reference to Bühler's deixis at the phantasm (Bühler 1965 (Bühler [1934 ). Furthermore, we will link non-addressee deictic du back historically to two types of "person-shift" already discussed by Jakob Grimm in his 1856 article "Über den Personenwechsel in der Rede" [On person shift in discourse]. In this article, Grimm distinguishes between person shift in formulations of "rules and law" on the one hand, and person shift in what he calls "thoumonologue" on the other. The subjective interpretation of non-addressee-deictic du in present-day German may have originated from these "thou-monologues".
All non-addressee deictic du usages in interaction rely on the inference that the speaker is not referring to the addressee (exclusively), i.e. that the usual conditions for the interpretation of the second person singular personal pronoun do not hold. In addition, the recipient of the utterance has to draw inferences about the correct interpretation of the "shifted pronoun". As analysts, we therefore need to do two things: (a) we have to prove which inferences have been drawn by the recipient, and (b) we have to look into the contextual information that has led the recipient to draw these particular inferences.
With respect to (a), the standard methodology provided by conversation analysis is to rely on recipients' sequentially next utterances for gaining insights into how they understood what was not said but meant (cf. Bolden 2010 , Deppermann & Blühdorn 2013 Schegloff 1996) . In the case of du, the main evidence available to the speaker as well as to the analyst that the inference that s/he is not meant personally has been drawn correctly by the recipient is negative: it comes from the fact that the recipient does not respond with an utterance predicated over himself/herself. Hence, if the response to the example above: was meinst_e wie schnell de was ANgedreht krichst ('you don't know how quickly you get knocked up'), is something like 'yes, right', rather than something like 'No, I always use condoms', the recipient can be seen to display to the speaker an understanding of that speaker's utterance which is based on the inference that the utterance was intended as non-addressee specific (in this case, indeed generic). Failure of a recipient to draw the inference that s/he is not the referent of a du-utterance occurs (as anecdotal evidence suggests; cf. Kluge 2016), but is rare. Conversely, this means that the grounds on which recipients' inferences can be drawn are strong and that there is usually enough evidence in the linguistic and non-linguistic context that warrants them. However, the identification of specific types of non addressee-deictic readings of du cannot usually be based on next turn proof procedure, but has to rely on the same contextual features that the participants base their inferences on, such as membership categorization, topic, epistemic authority etc.
The following extract illustrates one of those rare instances, in which the ambiguity of the second person pronoun as addressee-deictic or non-addressee deictic comes to the interactional surface. The lacking inference here is strategy, however, rather than a true misunderstanding. Three co-habitants, Jürgen, Sabrina and John, talk about hygiene concerning their duvets.
Extract (1) "duvets" (bb)3
27 Sbr: wieso hängst_e die nich n_bisschen und LÜFtest die mal, why don't you hang it a bit and air it PTCL Sabrina proposes to Jürgen to hang up his duvet outside (l. 27). While this proposal gets support from the roommate, John (l. 28), it is rejected by the addressee who claims that his duvet gets enough fresh air in the room (l. 30-31) . After several break-offs and restarts (omitted here), Sabrina finally gets the turn and begins an account for her proposal by formulating a truism about nocturnal perspiration (l. 48-49, arrows) . Although she uses the second person pronoun (boldface), the attribute 'perspiration' is not predicated over Jürgen alone, but over humans and their bodies in general, i.e. Sabrina formulates a generic statement. This, of course, includes herself as well as her co-participants. Jürgen, however, plays with the ambiguity of the pronoun by suggesting a direct, addressee-deictic reading, cf. his understanding check in l. 50: meiner 'mine'? Somewhat surprisingly, Sabrina confirms this reading, perhaps in the sense of 'yes, yours too' (l. 51), which Jürgen then counters with a contrastive statement that restricts perspiration to her (l. 52), but excludes himself (l. 53). In this way, he can devalue Sabrina's account and, indirectly, reject both her argument that duvets should be hung out in the fresh air and that he should follow her instruction to do so with his own duvet.
In extract (1), Sabrina clearly intends a generic reading of her utterance in l. 48-49, which is already suggested by the conditional constructional format and the argumentative discursive frame, in which reference to well-known truths and generally accepted cultural knowledge are regularly used to boost one's own argumentative position. As a strategic misunderstanding that treats the meaning of du as ambiguous and therefore problematic, the sequence demonstrates (a) that German du needs inferences to be interpreted as non-addressee deictic, and (b) that even when there are compelling contextual factors inviting such an inference, recipients can reject it and stick to the canonical, addressee-deictic interpretation.
Our paper is structured as follows. After a short overview of the existing literature (section 2) we describe the ways in which non-addressee deictic du can be used in contemporary conversational German (section 3). We then introduce Grimm's distinction between person-shifted du for formulating "rules and laws" and in a "thou-monologue" (section 4), before we present some thoughts on the historical development of nonaddressee deictic, subjective du for which we propose Grimm's "thou-monologue" as a decisive and hitherto neglected precedent (section 5). The data in section 3 consists of two subcorpora: a) the first season of Big Brother broadcast in 2000 (233 500 words) and b) the Freiburg Corpus "Dialektintonation" (217 000 words), comprising interviews with speakers of the urban varieties of Freiburg, Mannheim, Munich and Berlin. The data we use in section 5 will be introduced at the beginning of that section.
Previous research
All Germanic and most Romance languages have in their early history developed a generic/impersonal pronoun that grammaticized out of the word for '(male) human being' (cf., e.g., German/English man, French on, cf. Giacalone-Ramat & Sansò 2007 a & b; Winter-Froemel 2014) . This pronoun complements impersonal 'one' (Germ. einer) in the Germanic languages except English, where OE man disappeared already early. In German, Danish, etc., both are in complementary distribution, since man is not inflected. The meaning of the pronoun is ambiguous between a generic and an impersonal meaning (cf. Zifonun 2000) .
Many of these Germanic languages (e.g. German, Danish, Norwegian, Dutch) and a number of Romance languages (French, Spanish, Italian, Romanian), but also non-Indo-European languages4 additionally use the 2 nd Sg. pronoun in a non-addressee deictic, 'generic' function. Since the early papers by Laberge (1976) and Laberge & Sankoff (1979) on Canadian French, a range of authors have reported a similar usage for other languages as well: -for French Ashby (1992) ; Coveney (2003) ; Kluge (2011 Kluge ( , 2016 -for Spanish De Cock (2014 , Kluge (2011 Kluge ( , 2016 , Posio (2016) ; -for English ; Gast/Auwera (2013); , Kitagawa/Lehrer (1990) , Stirling/Manderson (2011); -for Danish Jensen (2009 ), Jensen/Gregersen (2016 ; -for Dutch de Hoop/Tarenskeen (2015); -for German Linthe (2010) , Kast (2009) , Kluge (2016) , Stukenbrock/Bahr (2016) , ; -for Russian Deringer et al. (2015) , to mention just a few.
There is, however, no agreement on the pragmatic meaning of this non-addressee deictic pronoun and its relationship with the traditional generic pronouns. For instance, some authors claim that non-addresseedeictic du "is favoured in contexts where the addressee is included in the reference of the generic pronoun" (Jensen & Gregersen 2016: 422) , such that this du "colours the genericity with a nuance of involvement which probably has to do with the original default reference to the second person" (2016: 440), while others argue that the pronoun is "a rather peculiar case where the speaker uses a 2sg form to refer to him or herself, in a sense 'hiding' behind a 'mask' of generic reference" (Kluge 2016 : 406 on Spanish and German) -a peculiarity which is then of course in need of an explanation.
Non-addressee deictic du in conversational German
In this section, we present four ways in which the second person singular pronoun can be used in a nonaddressee deictic way. We discuss the inferences that are necessary in order to arrive at the intended interpretation of the pronoun and the contextual features that block the addressee-deictic interpretation, or at least make it unlikely. We start with examples in which the inferential interpretation of the pronoun is generic or least generic within a social category which includes the speaker and the addressee. We then move on to cases in which the speaker uses du for a generic statement that holds for a social category of humans to which the speaker, but not the addressee belongs, or which neither the speaker nor the addressee belong to. With the use of the second person pronoun, the addressee is invited to join the perspective of humans who belong to the social category in question. Finally, we discuss examples in which speaker subjectivity prevails, i.e. in which the speaker mainly talks about himself/herself as an individual, not as a member of a social group. Again, the second person pronoun is used to invite a deictic displacement into an imagined world which the speaker shares with the addressee. We will use both Bühler's theory of deictic displacement and Grimm's description of shifted pronouns in "thou-monologues" to account for these usages.
It should be stressed that the order in which we discuss the various uses of non-addressee deictic du does not parallel their historical development, as will be shown in section 5.
Generic du including the addressee
The first type of use of non-addressee deictic du is closest to what one might call 'generic'. Du is predicated over an unspecified totality of persons for whom a 'rule' or 'truth' as formulated by the speaker is claimed to hold, including the speaker and the addressee. The addressee has to draw the inference that the utterance includes him/her only as a member of this unspecified totality, but not specifically as an individual.
In the first example of this type, two friends, Zlatko and Jürgen, are talking about a mole that Zlatko has just discovered on Jürgen's back. The extract starts with Zlatko's proposal to just rip it off (l. 583); Jürgen warns against doing this (l. 585 and 587), since removing a mole needs surgery by specialists (l. 588 and 590).
Note that in enclitic position, the second person pronoun du is reduced to -de (-e after t-final stems) as in l. 585, and can sometimes even be omitted entirely in vernacular German (as in l. 587, 590). The second person is, however, always marked unambiguously by the inflectional ending on the verb stem, i.e. -st. All forms of the second person singular (pronouns and inflectional endings) to which we refer in the analysis are highlighted by bold-face in the transcripts. In this sequence Jürgen makes four du-statements which increasingly become generic. The first du-utterance in l. 585 may still be understood as addressee deictic, particularly as Jürgen contradicts Zlatko who has expressed his personal preference for a certain course of action (ripping off the mole). Zlatko requests an account (l. 586), which leads to Jürgen's generalized statement 'you must not rip off a mole'. The rule applies to anyone who happens to have a mole that needs to be removed. This genericity becomes even more explicit in the following reformulation of the same generalization ('that's something you must have done by surgery if at all'), ending in a free-standing conditional conjunction (cf. Auer 2002) . In this conditional construction, speaker and addressee are referentially included in the totality of persons for whom the rule applies (Jürgen has the mole himself and Zlatko has just stated what he would do in case he had a mole). In cases like this, the 2nd person pronoun could be replaced by the impersonal pronoun man that constitutes the default case in contexts of maximal genericity. However, the use of generic du instead of man makes the appeal to the recipient more personal and more binding. Although the referent of du could be anybody, just like anybody can be in the du-role, i.e. in the participation role of the recipient, the present recipient is the situational instantiation of this universal quantification. He represents or incarnates quasi as a proxy everyone who could be in the du-role. Hence, the meaning of du here is: 'you, my recipient, just like anybody who might be my recipient'.
Zlatko has no problem with inferring that the arrowed utterances are not predicated over him alone but express general rules. His understanding is displayed through his next utterances, which are not predicated over him either; rather, he requests a medical explanation for the rule "you must not rip a mole off by yourself" and formulates a candidate explanation (l. 589). We therefore have to ask on which grounds he can draw this inference. The most important cue here is the deontic verb (dürfen) in combination with the second person that strongly suggests reference to a general rule (cf. Laberge/Sankoff 1980 John (Jhn) and Jürgen (Jrg) talk about the weekly task they have to undertake as a joint endeavor with their house-mates. Upon successful completion, they are rewarded with material goods most of them greatly desire. In the beginning of the extract, John produces a positive assessment of this weekly challenge that he enjoys for its own sake, i.e. independent of material gratification. After a short pause, he expands his turn, marking his assessment as personal (l. 389). A rather long pause ensues (l. 390), which can be heard as foreshadowing disagreement. John once more expands his turn (l. 391) by explaining why he thinks that the challenge has its own value independently of the reward. Jürgen now finally agrees by transforming John's statement into a generalized evaluation that no longer refers to the concrete case of the weekly tasks alone (l. 392-393): according to his opinion, everything is fun if 'you know that you can achieve something' (l. 393), which is presented as a general 'rule of life' (or a truism). As such, it refers to an unspecified totality of human beings including the speaker and the addressee who may or may not agree with this. The 'rule' is formulated by the use of the second person pronoun. In contrast to John's positive evaluation of immaterial gratification, the material aspect, gaining luxury, is reintroduced. The context for the generic reading and the exclusion of an addressee-deictic reference is provided, on the one hand, by the general quantifier alles ('everything'), and, on the other hand, by the conditional construction (l. 393: wenn du weisst 'if you know ...'; cf. Gast et al. 2015 on the affinity of generic readings and conditionals). The example is very similar to extract (2), but the deontic force of a 'rule of life' in example (3) is weaker than that of the explicit prohibition formulated in example (2). Also, its interactional status is different. In extract (2) there is no disagreement; Zlatko accepts Jürgen's rule, according to which moles must not be removed without surgery. In (3), however, Jürgen's truism is a way to cover a slight disagreement about what makes people like challenges. Instead of exposing this disagreement as a personal opinion, Jürgen uses the less opposing format of a general rule meant to include everyone who likes challenges in the face of some kind of gratification or reward.
Generic statements in the format of rules, truisms, principles, etc. can also be categorically restricted, i.e. they may only be valid for the members of a particular social category to which both the speaker and the recipient belong. This is the case in extract (4). Here, three men (Alex, Zlatko and Jürgen) talk about the use of contraceptives.
Extract 4 "pill for the man" (bb) . 'Safety' is thereby elaborated as protection against 'being knocked up by a woman with whom one has sex and who then claims to be pregnant'. The statement, which is formulated as a 'rule of (male) life', is obviously predicated over the speaker himself and his recipients, but also over the generic category of all 'men'. Women, however, are excluded, which is not stated explicitly but can be inferred from the topic 'pill for men'. We can therefore speak of a category-bound generalization here (Sacks 1972) . In the extract, the generalization is bound to the category of men; therefore, the deontic force of Alex' warning holds for all co-participants as well.
There is of course a certain amount of indeterminacy regarding the question of whether a deontic statement which makes a category-bound generalization is applicable to the speaker as well as to the addressee, since joint category membership may be negotiable. This can be seen in the following example.
In extract (5), we are in a multi-party conversation between three participants, A, A's husband B and the interviewer C. The participants talk about hiking in the mountains and the dangers and risks of glacier tours, for which A is a specialist (but C is not). When A describes the general requirements hikers must fulfil when they climb mountain tops (l. 1-4), she deploys the generic pronoun man ('one'). A bit later, she switches to du ('thou') when she goes into the particulars of the (much more demanding) glacier tours (l. 7-8).
Extract 5 First note that the du-utterance in line 07/08 does not receive a specific response. Neither B nor C feel selected as next speakers. A's preceding utterance is clearly understood as precluding an addressee-deictic reading of du. The generic reading is inferable in a context where the speaker is in the course of formulating the requirements of hiking and has already started to do so by using the maximally generic man (lines 01-03). Moreover, a conditional construction is used in the first part of the turn that also creates the context for a generic understanding (cf. Gast et al. 2015; Stukenbrock & Bahr 2017) . This remains latent in the second part of A's explanation (lines 07-08) which can be heard as an expansion and as a specification of those rules that apply to glacier tours in particular.
The conversation moves from a less personal to a more personal mode. In the first lines, the speaker makes general observations on the do's and don'ts of hiking that might be considered common ground (Clark 1996) (cf. the natürlich 'of course' in line 01). In the second part, she talks about her own experiences as an advanced glacier mountaineer. In this role, she claims epistemic authority (Heritage & Raymond 2005) which, importantly, also endows her with a heightened degree of deontic authority which is locally mobilized to legitimize her formulation of glacier rules. Continuing to use man would implicate that the same amount of common ground holds for glacier tours as for 'normal' hiking tours. The switch from man to du personalizes the statement and activates a relationship of authority between the experienced glacier hiker and her audience. Yet, the du also introduces another shade of meaning here; for although the rules of glacier hiking definitely apply to everybody, it is not the case that everybody will ever come in a situation where s/he has to follow them. In a sense, then, A talks about a rule that is only relevant for the rather small group of glacier hikers, and hence potentially category-bound, possibly excluding her addressees. The example shows that categories can be constructed and negotiated in the emerging conversation; and non-addressee deictic du-uses are particularly suited to invite such negotiations. It is up to the recipients of the glacier rule to decide whether they want to accept its deontic value for themselves, i.e. accept it as a generic rule, or rather interpret it as a rule that only applies to the social category of glacier mountaineers, i.e. excluding them. It is this second way of interpreting a non-addressee deictic du-statement to which we now turn.
Category-bound du excluding the addressee and requiring a deictic shift
In the examples discussed so far, du was used to formulate a generic statement that holds for both the speaker and the addressee (as well as for anybody else or at least anybody else who shares with them a particular social categorization). The examples in the next group also express a generalization, but there is an important difference: while the speaker is part of the category of people about whom the statement is made, the addressee is not. Hence, while in the set of examples discussed in the previous section, the pronoun du was used in a non-addressee deictic way because the addressee was not meant individually but only as a member of larger group, the cases to be discussed in this section are non-addressee deictic in a more dramatic way: the addressee cannot interpret them as being about him or her at all.
In the following extract (6), John tells Zlatko about his experiences as a squatter. Upon being asked how squatters go about occupying a house (l. 167-169), John explains the procedure. However, he does not use the first person but the second person pronoun, generalizing over all incumbents of the social category 'squatter'. Zlatko, his interlocutor, has never been a squatter (as evidenced by his question) and is therefore excluded from the social category.
Extract 6 "squatters" (bb) In describing the 'real squatter', John heavily relies on his own experience and displays an epistemic authority derived from the perspective of an insider. Nonetheless, he gives a generic account on how expert squatters normally proceed. This account also has a deontic flavor (cf. the initial, broken-off utterance in line 170: du musst det schon… 'you have to…'), since it is about the rules or practices a proper squatter is expected to follow. But the group of referents for which the rules of squatting hold does not include his addressee.
Had the speaker used the first person pronoun ich, his talk would have been heard as a personal narrative. Inversely, the use of man would have displayed a detached attitude not quite in line with the speaker's insider knowledge. It would have been understood as a distancing strategy, possibly even implicating a negative stance both towards the category and his former membership. John's account of the squatter's modus operandi would have literally turned into an impersonal, matter-of-fact delivery, blocking speaker and addressee involvement alike. The non-addressee deictic use of du, however, accomplishes both a generic and a personal narrative. At the end of John's long explanation of what 'you' do as a squatter, Jürgen finally asks him (l. 197 
): did they [meaning the authorities] ever PTCL try to PTCL get you out of there?
The second person plural pronoun is now used deictically to refer to the addressee and his squatter friends. This displays Jürgen's understanding of John's narrative being not only about the prototypical squatter, but (also) about himself, via his belonging to this category.
The next example illustrates a similar case. Again, a category-bound generalization is formulated by the use of the second person pronoun du. We join the participants when John (the same speaker as in Extract 6), who grew up and lives near Berlin, i.e. in the former GDR, starts a personal narrative (l. 01: als ick 'when I' ...) about his experiences in the Black Forest shortly after the Wende. He was always categorized as an Ossi, a term that denotes the 'East Germans' from the perspective of the 'West Germans'. As in extract 6, the du-utterances that follow are predicated over the speaker as part of the social category 'East German', but clearly exclude his recipients (who are all from the West).
Extract 7 "Ossi" (bb) Several temporal layers interact in John's conversational self-positioning here. The (other-)categorization as 'Ossi' is first narrated as a past event. The recipients show their empathy with the narrator and qualify the Black Forest locals' behavior as some kind of 'racism' (lines 09, 10). In the final line of the extract, however, the pronoun du no longer refers to the Easterners' experiences in the past, but in general (cf. the formulation in the generic present tense als OSsi wirste grUndsätzlich ABjeschrieben erstma 'as Easterner you are always written off at first'). The examples discussed in this section are generic in the sense of generalizing over a group of people who are members of a certain social category. Both the speaker and the recipients know that this category excludes the addressee, but includes the speaker. Hence, the usual interpretation of the second person pronoun as referring to the addressee is blocked. What are the inferences triggered by the incongruence between the use of the second person pronoun du and the mutual knowledge of the participants that the recipient does not belong to the social category invoked by the speaker? It is obvious that they cannot be the same as in the case of a generic reading of the pronoun as discussed in the last section. The inference of the recipient cannot be: the speaker wants to emphasize that I, the recipient, am one of those humans for which the generic statement holds.
From the very early writings on non-addressee deictic second person pronouns such as Laberge & Sankoff's 1979 study based on interviews in Canadian French in the 1970s (also see Laberge 1977) , it has been claimed that this non-canonical usage of the second person pronoun somehow invites the recipient to assume a discursive role not corresponding to his or her situational role, "imagining [him-or] herself in the position of the protagonist", i.e. the speaker (Kluge 2016: 509) . Sometimes, mental space theory has been used (Rubba 1996) to describe this transposition of the recipient into a mental space built up by the speaker.
We propose a theoretically different account whereby the addressee is invited by the speaker to transpose him/herself into an imagined world in which s/he belongs to the same social category as the speaker. To account for the deixis-theoretical specificities involved in a linguistic analysis of the spectrum of addressee and non-addressee deictic usage of du, we recur to deixis theory. We suggest that this transposition is a special case of Bühler's "Deixis am Phantasma" (1965 [1934 : 121ff.).7 (In English, various terms such 'deixis at the phantasm' or 'deixis in the imagination' are used.) What Bühler had in mind originally were deictic utterances referring to non-present entities that can only be accessed in imagination. The participants have to displace themselves (their origo) to an imagined spatio-temporal frame within which they can 'see' or 'experience' the absent phenomena as if they were present or real (cf. Stukenbrock 2014 Stukenbrock , 2015 . Note that in our case, deictic reference at the phantasm is not to a third person or object in an imagined space, but rather to the addressee (the referent of the pronoun du). However, since a canonical addressee-deictic interpretation of the pronoun is blocked, the addressee in the speech situation is invited to displace him/ herself into a phantasm in which s/he is a member of the social category invoked by speaker. Applied to the extract above ("0ssi"), this means that the speaker, by using the second person pronoun in a context in which a purely addressee deictic understanding is impossible, requests his addressees to transpose themselves into an imagined world in which they are members of the social category to which the speaker belongs. This is what invites (and even forces) the recipients to engage with the speaker in joint perspectivetaking via imagined co-membership in a category for which a generalization is presented.
Category-bound generic du excluding the addressee and the speaker
Deictic shifts of the type described in section 3.2. are triggered by the fact that the recipient cannot interpret the second person pronoun in a direct way, since the du-statement is ostensibly about a social category to which the speaker, but not the addressee belongs. In this section we look into cases of non-addressee deictic du in which none of the participants, i.e. not even the speaker, is part of the group of people for whom the category-bound generic statement holds.
In the following extract, the topic is high performance athletes and their huge revenues. Some participants, among them Manuela, argue that these athletes and their families have gone through so many financial and personal sacrifices that a very high income is justified. Others, like Kerstin, argue that this argument is not valid as the whole training is financed with state money, particularly in Eastern Europe. Kerstin as well as Manuela, who responds to her in l. 11, are both from West Germany, and they are no high performance athletes, i.e. they are talking about a social category which they do not belong to. This is common ground shared by all participants in this conversation. Kerstin argues that high performance sports represent the country to the outside world and will therefore be financially supported even by poor states. This counters previous claims put forward by Manuela that enormous revenues of high performance athletes are justified on the grounds of early financial sacrifices undergone by their families. Again, Manuela contradicts Kerstin arguing that high revenues compensate for many years of personal sacrifice implied in becoming a sports champion L. 11). Hence, when Manuela talks about becoming so good that you can represent your country (l. 11) , she does not refer to any of the co-participants, nor to herself, but to the category of high performance athletes to which none of them belong.8 A similar, but somewhat more complex case of this non-canonical use of the second person personal pronoun is found in extract 9. The participants discuss how to counteract the spread of sexual diseases among young people.
Extract 9 "condoms" (bb) The agency for the proposed measures does not lie with any of the participants in the conversation, but with those who are deemed responsible for public health and the well-being of the youth. Neither the speaker nor any of the addressees belong to this category of people. Kerstin and the others are not acting in the real world but in a hypothetical world, in which they imagine to be in a responsible position. Nonetheless, they use the second person pronoun instead of alternative formats either with man (an jeder Kasse könnte man die doch hinlegen) or with an agentless passive construction (an jeder Kasse könnten die doch liegen/hingelegt werden). The second person pronoun invites the others to join in in this collaborative imagining. Its use both mobilizes and displays a shared stance vis-à-vis the hypothetical "free condoms"-initiative. The imagined initiative is presented as so easy to implement that the participants' collaborative imagining is simultaneously a form of joint moral indignation about the lack of similar initiatives and about those responsible for, but negligent of preventive health care. By the repeated use of du, the participants display to each other that they all agree upon 'if we were them (i.e. those responsible), we would take immediate action and not lack ideas about efficient implementation'.
Subjective du
The last group of non-addressee deictic du-usages in our collection consists of cases in which speakers primarily talk about themselves. No social category is invoked. The focus is on the speaker's personal or even private experiences. More or less exclusive epistemic, emotional and/or embodied access to these experiences entails that the set of potential referents is reduced to the speaker alone. The addresseedeictic interpretation of the second person pronoun is therefore once again blocked. At the same time, the recipient is invited to transpose him/herself into a hypothetical world in which s/he can take the speaker's perspective.
In the first extract exemplifying this type of du-use, Kerstin talks with her roommate Joana about her past and present relationships. Joana is an attentive listener and looks at Kerstin throughout the extract, but otherwise remains silent. 9 Jana's suggestion to distribute condoms in public health centres (line 06) is rejected by Kerstin: zum geSUNDheitsamt gehst_e doch nich HIN 'yes but you don't go to the public health authorities' (line 07). This rejection also uses the second person pronoun but is different from the other utterances in that it may include the speaker even though they are too old to be subsumed under the social category 'kids'; cf. Joana's concurring statement in line 08 which is formulated in the first person singular.
Extract 10 "morals" (bb) Kerstin has come to the conclusion that her numerous past relationships were all very nice but haven't "paid off so well for her". She fears (line 04) that her present love affair might be just another one in the row. Throughout the extract, Kerstin is clearly talking about herself, not about her recipient, and not about any social category of people to which her statement could be generalized. This also holds for the utterance in line 03, where she uses the second person pronoun. (The same line is repeated almost verbatim in l. 07 with the second person pronoun replaced by the first person ich.) Joana draws the correct inference that the du-utterance is not predicated over her, which in this case is very easy to do, as she does not share Kerstin's individual past experiences. Based on this inference, she remains silent -which would have been difficult to do had she interpreted Kerstin's talk as being about her. In our second example, extract 11, John, Alex and Jürgen talk about an absent house mate and her unpredictable behavior.
Extract 11 "catwoman" (bb) John describes the woman's behavior in the first lines of the extract based on his own experiences: while he does the dishes, she comes and all of a sudden starts to caress him. This description is presented with John referring to himself with the second person pronoun (l. 02: dative dir, l. 03: nominative du). Jürgen agrees indirectly by comparing the woman with a cat, a comparison which is emphatically confirmed by the others and leads to more examples of the woman's cat-like behavior: Alex says in continuation of John's example that, once she has had enough, she disappears as suddenly as she came. John closes the sequence by adding that the caressing can quickly turn into a hit with the paw, again using the second person pronoun to refer to himself as the victim of the woman's attacks (line 19). John's recipients correctly draw the inference that the second person pronoun is not used to refer to them in an addressee-deictic way in lines 02-03. Nonetheless, its non-addressee deictic usage is able to mobilize their concurrences: John's description of the woman leads to a high degree of agreement among the three men. Narrating his own experience in the 2 nd person invites agreement and perspective-sharing, which may or may not be nourished by similar experiences of the other men with the woman in question.
Our next example comes from a radio phone-in show in which callers often bring up weird and extreme topics related to their own views, habits or preferences. In these cases, it is obvious that the second person pronoun used to express them cannot refer uniquely to, and not even include referentially, the moderator (host). Nevertheless, there are many cases in which speakers deploy the second person pronoun in order to invite the host and the audience to share their perspective, even though this may be a difficult task, given the issues at hand.
In extract 12, the caller (UW) talks about his sexual orientation and the somewhat appalling sexual practices he takes pleasure in. The sequence comes from the final part of the call when the topic is about to be closed. The caller has complained about his social isolation owing to the fact that he cannot talk about his sexual orientation with his friends. This issue is taken up by the moderator in lines 1148-1159 and reaffirmed by the caller. The final statement by the caller in lines 1161-62 closes the topic, summarizing the dilemma he finds himself in. The choice of the personal pronouns is interesting here, as there is a shift from non-addressee deictic du in the first part of the conditional construction (wenn dich das wirklich ANturnt 'if this really turns you on') to self-referential ich in the second part (wie kann ich_s ÄNdern 'how can I change it'). The use of two different deictic pronouns within the same sentence that have the same referent is highly unusual. It shows how close the second-person pronoun is to the first person pronoun referentially. Nevertheless, the transition indicates a shift of perspective: whereas the du in the first part of the sentence invites the recipient to take the caller's perspective, the second part portrays the speaker as the one responsible for active change of his situation and focuses on his agency in the real world.
As the three examples for subjective uses of the second person singular pronoun in this section have shown, the contextual features that lead the recipient to draw the inference that the speaker uses the pronoun in order to refer to himself/herself are mostly based on diverging epistemic grounds: only the speaker has access to the knowledge that allows him/her to present the facts that are presented. It is on the basis of these epistemic considerations that the recipient understands the self-referential meaning of the speaker's utterance and can then decide between a subjective, purely speaker-related and a category-bound interpretation. But of course, this decision is not always easy to make. Regardless of whether the second person pronoun refers to the speaker alone or a larger category, recipients can implicitly or explicitly opt in and out of the invitation to share the speaker's view, either a) by accepting or declining the speaker's co-categorization offer, or b) by displacing or refusing to displace themselves and thus participate in the speaker's experience. It is this openness to negotiation that is inherent in the non-addressee deictic use of du and constitutive of its specific interactional value.
The final example in this section shows such a negotiation. Three participants, Verena, Sabrina and Jürgen, talk about being at bars, discos and similar locations. As they narrate their own individual experiences, co-categorization based on sharing or not sharing the same experiences becomes an issue for the women. [hatt_]ich nisch. I didn't.
The extract starts with a complaint put forward by Jürgen about drinks in bars getting more and more expensive (l. 58). Sabrina contradicts, claiming that one beverage is usually for free (l. 59). Verena now begins to formulate a counter-argument against Sabrina (l. 60), along the lines that one small schnapps doesn't get you very far. The repeated use of the second person pronoun in her turn (dann trinkst du…, da kriegst du…) invites the recipients to share her perspective, but it remains open whether she is talking about her personal experiences or about a common experience of alcohol-drinkers at bars. Before Verena can finish her argument, Sabrina takes the turn again and disaligns with Verena (l. 62: ich TRINK ja kein alkohol-'I don't PTCL drink alcohol'). Whereas Verena drinks alcohol and implicates that the others do as well, Sabrina rejects the idea of having a free schnapps and also rejects sharing Verena's experience. Her rejection, though negating the content of the implicature, nonetheless displays that she draws certain inferences: first, that Verena, albeit using the second person pronoun, is speaking about herself and not addressing Sabrina or Jürgen personally; and secondly, that she, Sabrina, though not addressed deictically, is invited to share the perspective and co-categorize with Verena. A similar sequence develops immediately afterwards with reversed roles. Now it is Sabrina who talks about her experience at bars (l. 65-66). The switch from the first to the second person pronoun (l. 63: wenn ich da STEH dann hast_e 'when I am standing there then you have…') suggests that Sabrina makes a subjective statement about herself, using the second person pronoun to invite Verena to take her perspective. Alternatively, Sabrina might also be seen as inviting Verena's co-categorization under the social category of 'women alone at a bar' (who never stay alone for long). Like Sabrina before, it is now Verena who contradicts, which may be seen as a rejection of the co-categorization with the previous speaker (l. 67, 'I didn't'). Under this interpretation, non-addressee deictic du is an instrument of other-positioning on behalf of the speaker. It confronts the recipient with a social category s/he may or may not want to belong to, without doing so explicity. The conversational negotiation of whether an experience is shared and co-categorization is acceptable can be taken as evidence that recipients draw the relevant inferences and, moreover, that they may feel the need to explicitly contradict and reject an implicated inclusion into a category. Note, however, that if the other-positioning on behalf of a speaker is accepted, the use of non-addressee deictic du can also be a strategy for establishing shared identities, and for creating joint social categories ad hoc that were up to now irrelevant for the interaction.
To sum up: in sections 3.2 and 3.3. we have explained the inferences that are necessary to arrive at the intended interpretation of the non-canonical use of a second person pronoun by making use of Bühler's concept of deixis at the phantasm. Since the canonical addresssee-deictic reading is blocked, the referential interpretation of the addressee-deictic pronoun is shifted into a hypothetical world in which the addressee is taken to be a member of a social category invoked by the speaker, which allows sharing the latter's perspective. The inferential process crucially depends on the addressee's willingness to imaginatively share the social categorization, which does not exist in the real world, but is constructed in the hypothetical world on the basis of a deictic shift. In the subjective use of the second person pronoun discussed in this section, this social categorization is lacking; yet the speaker also seems to invite the addressee's alignment (in the sense of perspective-taking).
How exactly then can the deictic shift be analyzed that is responsible for this effect? Transposition into the phantasm alone obviously cannot account for it, since it cannot achieve a shift from an addresseerelated to a speaker-related interpretation of the pronoun. In order to add this piece to the puzzle, we need a further step in our theory. This can be found in Grimm's 1856 article on person shifts.
Jacob Grimm's "person shifts"
In his 1856 article "Über den Personenwechsel in der Rede" [On person shift in discourse], Jacob Grimm presents a historical overview of those usages of the personal pronouns in the Germanic languages that for some reason or other clash with the participant roles they are canonically linked to. He mentions two such "person shifts" for the second person singular pronoun. The first is the use of du as what he calls "pronomen der lehre und des gesetzes" ('pronouns of teachings and laws'). It prototypically occurs in teachings, appeals or commands to the addressee that convey or invoke some norm: "Sayings that contain teachings are proclaimed most warmly in the second person: the father standing before the child, the master before the disciple, who hear the saying and memorize it." (p. 33, our translation As Grimm points out, this use of the second person pronoun is already found in Old Germanic (predating the emergence of man) as well as in other Indo-European languages (such as in Latin legal texts). Norms are always generic statements. Therefore the du in this case expresses maximum genericity. At the same time, the addressee (the person who is being taught the rule) is definitely and foremost included in the range of referents for which the predicate holds. In this usage, maximal genericity is thus combined with personal poignancy. By deploying the second person pronoun, the speaker makes use of his or her authority. Compared to impersonal man, this appeal to the addressee to behave according to the norm is what gives it its meaning. The most obvious forms of this "person shift" are deontic statements (for instance, the Ten Commandments), but less explicit forms (as in example 14 above) also occur. It is easy to see the resemblance between Grimm's "pronouns of teachings and laws" and the noncanonical use of du in present-day German as discussed in section 3.1. above. They include the addressee but only as a member of a larger set (everybody or every member of a social category), and they often occur in deontic statements.
The second "person shift" mentioned by Grimm is the use of the second person singular pronoun in what he calls "thou-monologues" (but the term "thou-dialogue" would probably be more adequate to capture what he means). In this case, du is not generic, but referentially equivalent with ich ('I'). As Grimm puts it:
The real origin of the habit to talk with oneself must have been close to the vivid way of the people who, in such a situation, prefer the second person to the first. In a "thou-monologue", the speaker (S) enters into an inner dialogue with himself or herself (as an alter ego, S'), pondering about what to do or reflecting on what was done. This may happen in inner speech (as in the example, where the verbum sentiendi explicitly introduces the inner thoughts of the 'I') or in soliloquy, with no other person present. This seems to be the case Grimm had in mind. However, this inner dialogue can also occur in interaction, with a co-present recipient for whom the inner conflict is externalized and for whom it is performed. It is at this point that we can combine Bühler's deixis on the phantasm with Grimm's "thou-monologue".
In the interactive performance of the "thou-monologue", the co-participant, though not directly addressed by the pronoun du, is invited to not only witness the speaker's inner conflict from outside, but to imaginatively put him/herself in the place of the speaker who is addressed by the alter ego. The recipient is not only a witness of the speaker's internal deliberations, s/he is also invited to take part in them by stepping into the role of one of the dialogical partners, i.e. the speaker S. This is done via a deixis in the imagination in Bühler's sense, merging the addressee in the real speech situation (the canonical referent of the second person personal pronoun) with S, the imagined addressee of the speaker's alter ego (S'). Consider again extract (10), repeated here for convenience:
Extract 10 "morals" (bb) 01 Ker: und ich mein das waren ALles schöne beZIEhungen und wirklich nette MENschen und ehm °h ich ehm hab auch mit denen noch konTAKT, and I mean these were all beautiful relationships and really nice people and uhm °h I uhm am still in contact with them, 02 und es ist auch wirklich SCHÖN und so. °h and it is really nice and so on. → 03 aber im endeffekt äh:: BRINGT es dir nicht soviel;=ja? but in the end uhm it doesn't really pay off for you so well; you know? 04 und des ist auch JETZ wieder;= and now it is again the same thing; 05 wo ich mir irgendwie DENke::; (. The whole sequence does not need a recipient and would then represent, in Grimm's terminology, a "thoumonologue" (cf. line 03) followed by an 'I'-monologue (line 07), or, in a different terminology, an inner dialogue between Kerstin and her alter ego which she addresses with the second person pronoun, and an inner dialogue with her alter ego which she addresses with the first person pronoun. The difference between the two variants is only relevant when a recipient is co-present. In the first case, this co-participant is invited to perform a deictic shift, merging with Kerstin's alter ego, while in the second case, no such displacement is required or invited. The du-formulation encourages Joana to merge with this 'other Kerstin' and in this way take her perspective and sympathize with her point of view. Grimm does not give examples of the non-addressee deictic du in conversational speech as discussed in sections 3.2-3.4. above. For him, "thou-monologues" seem to be a phenomenon of the written (literary?) language or of inner speech. In these cases, the merger between an imaginary alter ego and the addressed co-participant does not play a role. We will now present evidence that cases requiring a deictic displacement already existed at his time (cf. section 5).
Origin and Spread of non-addressee deictic du
In the last section we have argued that in a large number of examples in our collection of non-canonical, non-addressee deictic du-uses, the speakers, by using the second person pronoun, talk about themselves or a social category to which they belong. At the same time, they invite their recipients to join them and share their perspective. Particularly this last aspect seems to have escaped Grimm. In this section we will look into the depths of historical time and the spread of non-addressee deictic du in more detail.
The du/Sie barrier
Before we do so, it needs to be pointed out that German has two pronouns of address for single addressees, whose choice is determined along the well-known TU/VOS politeness rules. Between unacquainted adults, the pronoun of distance (Sie, 'you') is the unmarked choice; du ('thou') is used among people who are in a personal relationship or share a social category membership. Non-reciprocal du is only used with children. Transition from Sie to du is a ritual act and non-reversible. While the complex details that govern the selection of du and Sie need not concern us here, it is important to note that any relationship between two adult persons falls either in the class of du-or Sie-relationships. Depending on the type of relationship, choice of the address pronoun is never free.
This raises the following questions: (a) can the pronoun of distance (Sie) be used in a Sie-relationship in non-addressee deictic ways as well? And (b) can non-addressee deictic du be used in a Sie-relationship, and vice versa, can Sie be used in a non-addressee deictic way in a du-relationship? The answer to the first question is positive,12 but non-addressee deictic Sie seems to occur much more rarely in this case. The most 12 One of the rare examples in our corpus is the following (in Bavarian dialect), in which the speaker switches from an impersonally used first person pronoun in line 04 (cf. Extract 20 below for this usage) to the polite form of the address pronoun (Sie) in the following line. Both pronouns are used to make a general statement, but at the same time add a subjective touch (the speaker indirectly claims first hand knowledge). straightforward explanation is that in a Sie-relationship, it would come across as encroaching to engage the other in the way non-addressee deictic du engages the co-participant, given the negative politeness rules that characterize such a relationship.13 The question of whether the functions of non-addressee deictic Sie, where it occurs, are the same as those of non-addressee deictic du needs a separate investigation. Based on unsystematic observation we suspect that Sie is used less to refer mainly or only to the speaker (also see Section 5.3 below and note 9), and that ambiguous cases in which it cannot be decided whether the recipient is addressed individually or as part of a generic statement are more frequent. The second question is more important for our discussion. Here, we observe a clear imbalance: while non-addressee deictic du also occurs in Sie-relationships, the opposite (non-addressee deictic Sie in a du-relationship) is excluded. However, non-addressee deictic du occurs much less often in a Sierelationship than in a du-relationship. In the Big-Brother data from which most of our examples in section 3 are taken, the normalized frequency of non-addressee deictic du per 10 000 words is 14, as compared to a normalized frequency of man of 24.7 (1 : 1.76). In a corpus of interview speech from the same period (around the year 2000), in which the participants are in a Sie-relationship, the corresponding values are 13.3 and 56.38 (1 : 4.24) (from Kast 2009). Non-deictic du, although not addressing the recipient, still seems to clash with the politeness rules in a Sie-relationship. This proves that the pronoun is not judged to be part of a soliloquy only, but engages the addressee. The encroachment on the co-participant is doubled in this case. The addressee is engaged in joint perspective taking (as in the case of non-addressee deictic Sie), and in addition, s/he is made to do so by the use of a pronoun that contradicts politeness rules.
Nevertheless, the fact that the non-addressee deictic use of the polite second person singular pronoun (Sie) is strictly excluded in a du-relationship while the opposite is at least possible suggests a degree of conventionalization of the shifted use of du, which can occur outside the context from which it has originated. This is one of the reasons why we can safely speak of language change that has gone beyond mere conversational inferencing.
How old is non-addressee deictic du?
The use of the second person pronoun for generic statements such as rules and laws is of course an ancient feature of the Indo-European (and other) languages, predating by far the grammaticalization of generic/ impersonal pronouns derivative of the word for "man". In fact, the latter type of grammaticalization can be seen as driven by the need to establish a neutral ("impersonal") way of expressing (social) rules and regularities which abstracts away from the discourse participants (and particularly the addressee). The generic uses of du described in section 3.1 are therefore no innovations at all, but variants of an ancient non-canonical use of the second person pronoun. Rather, the innovation are uses of du that require the recipient to perform a deictic displacement (deixis in the imagination), as discussed in sections 3.2-3.4. We argue that Grimm's "thou-monologues" are the predecessor of these uses, i.e. they paved the way for the inferences that are needed for their understanding. While they still represent a purely speaker-internal pseudo-dialogue between the speaker and his or her alter ego, the present-day uses discussed in 3.2-3.4 go beyond this by co-engaging the addressee in a hypothetical world.
The fact that Grimm does not mention du-uses that require a deictic displacement suggests that by the middle of the 19 th century, they were not common at least in educated language. Yet it is possible to find rare instances of this usage even before the publication of Grimm's article.14 Unsystematic searches15 in 18 th and 19 th century drama texts yielded some rare instances.16 We found the oldest example in a play from the late 18 th century written by the young J. W. von Goethe (1776). In the first scene of the play, Gonzalo and Sebastian talk about a third person (Pedro) and his brother:17 Extract 16 (Claudine von Villa Bella; BA IV, 76) GONZALO. Hat's ihm noch nicht geglückt, was von seinem Bruder auszufragen? Hasn't he been able to sound out his brother? SEBASTIAN. Ihm? Das ist mir der rechte Spion! Er ist ja so verliebt, daß, wenn du nach der Stunde fragst, er nicht weiß, in welcher Tasche seine Uhr steckt. He? He is some kind of a spy! He is so much in love that when you ask him the hour, he doesn't know which pocket his watch is in.
The referent of du in Sebastian's response cannot be Gonzalo; the pronoun therefore cannot be interpreted in an addressee-deictic way. Rather, as the conditional clause suggests, any person wanting to ask Pedro the time who will find out that he is too much in love to find his watch. Only in an imagined world would Gonzalo be one of these persons. (Schmeller 1821: 195 , translation PA/AS) Grimm subsumes these examples under his "teachings and laws" (1856: 34), but it seems that the addressee is excluded in these cases, and hence a deictic displacement is necessary. However, given Schmeller's somewhat cryptic account, it remains speculation to equate these observations with modern usage. 15 Since electronic searches for du are a hopeless endeavor, we limited our search to du in the context of a wenn-(conditional) clause, as the modern usage is frequently found in this context. ‛In front of the house is a fountain, --a fountain to which I am bound by a charm like melusina and her sisters. Descending a gentle slope, you come to an arch, where, some twenty steps lower down, water of the clearest crystal gushes from the marble rock. ' (12. Mai) The novel is composed of letters of the hero to his friend, i.e. the du in the novel usually refers to this absent addressee. In the extract quoted, however, the referent cannot be the recipient of the letter who does not know the garden scenery. Rather, Werther describes his own experience. The recipient has to perform a deictic displacement into the world described by Werther in order to interpret the second-person pronoun.
LEHNL. Ihr habt's notwendig, daß ihr euch beklagt. G'rad heut' zu Tag' kann man thun, was man mag und kein Mensch legt ei'm 'was in' Weg. → Aber zu meiner Zeit, weil i noch jung war, da wenn du nur → g'schnauft hast, bist schon eing'sperrt word'n. You need to complain! Today one can do exactly what one wants and nobody will get in one's way. But in my times, when I was still young, if you only took a breath you were already put in jail.
TONI. No -und g'rad die Alt'n sag'n, früher war a bessere Zeit. Yes -and it is the old folks who say that in former times things were better.
Extract 18 (Alberti, Im Suff, 1890, 2nd Act)
HELENE:
Ich wollte dich täuschen -ich wollte 's dir verschweigen -aber nun -is's ja -nicht mehr nötig -nicht mehr nötig -mein Vater ... I wanted to deceive you -I wanted to keep it from you -but now -it is -no longer necessary -no longer necessary -my father… KRAWUTSCHKE. Unsinn! Bledsinn! -'s is ja der nüchternste Moann im Dienst nonsense! Rubbish! -he is the most sober man on duty →HELENE.
Im Dienst -ja! aber nachher -wenn du den Rücken gewendet hast! ... Gottchen, Gottchen, ist das nicht schrecklich, daß ich die Schande der ganzen Familie hier vor dir preisgebe? -aber ich muß! -dann trinkt 'r -trinkt -bis zur Bewußtlosigkeit -On duty -yes! But afterwards -when you turn your back on him! … My God my God, isn't it terrible that I give off the whole shame of my family here in front of you? -but I must! -then he drinks -he drinks himself -into oblivion It the first extract, Toni and Lehnl belong to different generations and compare their lives. It is obvious that they talk about their own experiences (or that of people in their generation, i.e. belonging to a certain social category), respectively, when they use the second person pronoun. The addressee is clearly not referred to, since she belongs to the other generation. Note that Lehnl switches between the impersonal/generic pronoun man which she uses for portraying the present-day generation (to which she does not belong) and du for her own generation. The pattern is exactly what we find in the present-day data: man expresses the speaker's distance from a group, du expresses inclusion of the speaker (cf. ex. (6) above). In the second example, Helene discloses a family secret to Krawutschke, i.e. that her father is an alcoholic. The second person pronoun as used by her therefore cannot refer to Krawutschke, but is based on her own experience with her father.
The examples show that the present-day usage of the non-addressee deictic second person pronoun requiring a deictic displacement is not a recent innovation (although it may still have been rare in the 18 th and 19 th century). The historical reconstruction of the beginnings of this usage of the second person pronoun is beyond the scope of this paper and needs a more thorough historical corpus analysis. It seems likely though that the bases of this emergence were both Grimm's "pronouns of teachings and laws" and his "thou-monologues". It is only by the amalgamation of elements of both of these that we can explain the particular mixtures of subjectivity and generalization that are typical of present-day non-canonical du. Jensen (2009) and Jensen & Gregersen (2016) investigated the spread of non-addressee deictic du in Danish in a real-time study based on interview data. They observed an increase of usage of generic du first in Copenhagen (around the 1970s), then throughout the rest of Denmark, with a peak around 2000. At that time, out of all generic pronouns, du made up around 25%. Afterwards, frequency seems to have stabilized at a lower level.
Spread of non-addressee deictic du in the 20th and 21st century
For German, real-time comparison is difficult as the older data sources (interviews) usually document speakers who are in a Sie-relationship; as outlined above, this makes the occurrence of non-addressee deictic du less likely. A comparison of older and more recent interview corpora suggests an increase in time, though. In an older, Swabian data set collected in 1955 -197518, Vahl-Seyfarth (1987 identified 16, 548 "indefinite subjects". 73.5% of them were expressed by man, only 0.3% (56) In a similar interview corpus with older dialect speakers from around 200019 investigated by Kast (2009) , the du-forms accounted for 13.85% in a total of 1,570 instances of man and non-addressee deictic du. However, there were huge differences between the cities, with Berlin (38%) by far exceeding the percentages in Munich, Freiburg and Mannheim (8.4%). But even leaving out the Berlin data, the comparison suggests that du in Sie-relationships has become much more frequent over three or four decades. The interpretation of this change is difficult, however. More than as evidence for a change in usage of the personal pronoun it must probably be seen as a consequence of changes in the genre of the interview, allowing for a more personal style at the end of the millenium than in the 1950s-1970s. Older corpora of colloquial German documenting participants in a du-relationship are rare and small. We searched the Corpora "FR -Korpus Grundstrukturen: Freiburger Korpus" and "DS -Dialogstrukturen" in the Datenbank für Gesprochenes Deutsch (DGD) provided by the IDS (http://dgd.ids-mannheim.de). The data were collected in 1960-1975.20 For practical reasons, we again had to narrow down the search to instances of non-address deictic du in conditional clauses (wenn du/wenn de). We normalized the results against the frequency of wenn man in du-relationships. For more recent corpora, we used the Callhome corpus21 (collected in 1998), once more the Big Brother (season 1) corpus22 and a recent (unpublished) corpus of student interactions collected by Elisabeth Zima (from 2015, 121,150 words). The results are summarized in Table (1): 18 Zwirner/Ruoff corpus, 553 Swabian speakers, appr. 600,000 words. 19 Eight interviews in four German cities from the Freiburg Corpus "Dialektintonation", mostly dialect speakers, 217,000 words. 20 We searched online in the data and eliminated the datasets in which speakers are in a Sie-relationship; these are the vast majority of the data. The online search facilities do not allow to give word/token numbers of manually selected subcorpora, but the remaining data set was very small. 21 By Talkbank, doi:10.21415/T56P4B; 205 067 tokens. 22 From 2000, 233,500 words. The results need to be treated with caution, as the numbers for the 1960-70 data are very low. Nevertheless, they suggest an increase of du at the expense of man until the end of the last century and a ceiling effect at a very high level afterwards, which corresponds exactly to the Danish results. The results for the FR/DS corpus suggest that non-addressee deictic du was used already 50 years ago, although much less frequently, at least among the (mostly) younger speakers in a du-relationship (students and young academics) whose language is documented in the FR/DS corpus. The very high percentages in the BB and Zima corpora from the turn of the century onward agree with Linthe's (2010) study among 40 German students, who found a percentage of non-addressee deictic du that exceeded that of man as well.
Concluding discussion
The following extract is from a (printed) interview in which a hobby mountaineer talks about why mountaineering is fascinating for him:
Extract 20 (from FAZ Magazin, Juni 2017, p 23) "Die Ungewissheit, ob ich das Ziel erreiche, ist viel größer als beim Marathonlauf. Ich weiß ja nicht, ob es eine Stelle gibt, die ich klettertechnisch nicht meistern kann. Da ist ein Grat, und nach aller Vernunft gehst du dort nie hinüber, denn der Mensch ist nicht dafür gemacht, um über einen solchen Grat zu gehen. Also: Ringe den inneren Schweinehund nieder, halt die Schnauze und geh rüber! Zur Hälfte getrieben von der Angst vor der eigenen Wut am Abend im Tal: Du wolltest unbedingt über den Mittellegi-Grat auf den Eiger gehen, das ist der Traum deines Lebens, und dann bist du auf halbem Wege umgekehrt! Ich hätte es nicht bei mir ausgehalten."
['The uncertainty whether I can reach the goal is much greater than when running a marathon. After all, I don't know whether there will be a passage I cannot cope with technically as a climber. There is a ridge, and as a rational being you will never cross it, for humans are not made for crossing such a ridge. So: Conquer your inner self, shut up and cross it! Half driven by the fear of your (lit. 'the') own rage that evening in the valley: You absolutely wanted to take the Mittellegi ridge to climb the Eiger, that's the dream of your life and then you turned back half-way! I wouldn't have been able to stand myself.']
The text, authored by a journalist who for a long time has been a linguistic style model and trend-setter, is typical of a style of German public talk that is considered 'modern' and highly attractive today. The author makes a general statement about mountaineering, but this statement is couched in very personalized terms. This appears to be in line with cultural and social developments foregrounding the individual's personal experience at the expense of abstract, depersonalized norms. The main stylistic device used to achieve this personalization are first and second person pronouns and verb forms.
The various uses of first and second person deixis require an array of interpretive strategies, based on various inferences. The speaker oscillates between an internal dialogue with himself, in which he addresses his alter ego with the second person pronoun (Du wolltest unbedingt über den Mittellegi In this paper, we have presented an analysis of the inferential processes that are necessary to understand one of these shifted pronouns, i.e., non-canonical, non-addressee deictic second person singular pronouns. On the basis of a close analysis of conversational data and the ways in which conversationalists display their understanding of du-utterances to each other, we have identified four types of this non-canonical usage. -In the first case, the second person pronoun refers to a collectivity of people to whom both the speaker and the addressee belong. Usually, this occurs in statements that formulate rules, truisms, wisdoms, etc. We have argued that this usage is embedded into the tradition of the ancient use of the second person pronouns for generic deontic statements (most prototypically found in the Ten Commandments). The understanding of these pronouns requires inferencing but no deictic displacement. The collectivity for which the generalization holds may be 'all humans' or a more restricted group of people (such as a collectivity defined by a social category). The two sub-types are schematically summarized in the following figures: -In the second case, the addressee of the du-utterance is ostensibly not part of the group of referents over which something is predicated. Rather, the speaker generalizes over the members of a social category which includes himself/herself but excludes the addressee. As the referent of du cannot be the addressee, there is a contradiction between the context and the rules for the canonical interpretation of second person pronouns. To solve the contradiction, the recipient has to perform a deictic shift into an imagined world, in which s/he is also a member of that social category ("deixis in the imagination" in the sense of Bühler). By inviting him/her to this displacement, the speaker also invites the addressee to take his/her perspective. With this shift established, the pronoun can be interpreted as in the first case. -In the third case, both the speaker and the addressee are ostensibly not part of the group of referents over which the predication holds. Again, the recipient has to perform a deictic shift. The speaker invites him/her to align not with a group of people s/he belongs to himself/herself, but rather with a third collective. Both the speaker and the addressee have to perform a displacement. -Finally, in the fourth case, which is most typically linked with the 'modern' style of extract 20, the addressee once again is ostensibly excluded as a referent; here, the required inference is that the speaker talks about himself/herself and his/her personal experiences, preferences, etc. In this case, the recipient also has to perform a deictic displacement. This displacement merges the recipient with an alter ego that the speaker is in an inner dialogue with. Our four types resemble a continuum proposed by Kluge (2016) , which ranges from (1) "I the speaker (hiding behind 'you')" over (2) "I, the speaker, as a representative of a larger entity", (3) "anyone", (4) "you, the person in front of me, as a representative of a larger entity" to (5), the canonical use, i.e. "you, the person in front of me". We have not found evidence for her type 4 in our data though.23 Even more importantly, her type (2) needs to be split into category-bound generalizations including and excluding the addressee. Beyond a simple typology based on the reference of du, we have tried to elaborate on the inferential processes necessary to arrive at these referential interpretations. Finally, we have presented some empirical evidence that non-addressee deictic du is not a recent invention, but has been available as a linguistic resource for at least more than two hundred years. It seems, however, that it is this specific kind of du-usage that has been spreading over the last five decades. Consequently, at present, non-addressee deictic du contrasts not only with impersonal/generic man, but also with first-person ich (as shown in extract 20).
Due to its particular function of co-engaging the addressee, non-addressee deictic du will not replace the generic/impersonal pronoun man ('one') in German. Man and du are not equivalent. Rather, the contrast between them has developed into a resource for distinguishing personal, subjective, category-bound or generic statements the speaker wants to be identified and the addressee is invited to align with, from those which s/he wants to keep a distance from.
